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Gestalt Psychology

Gestalt PsychologyGestalt theory was one of the major schools of psychology of the first half of the twentieth century. While its main early focus was a protest against the atomism or elementism that characterized its rival schools (such as structuralism and functionalism and, later, behaviorism), its emphasis on the organized, integrated nature of psychological enti­ties and processes has continued to influence the field throughout the remainder of the century. The German word Gestalt, roughly meaning “structure,” “whole,” “form,” or “configuration,” has no exact equivalent in English, so the term has become part of the technical vocabulary of psychology.

Gestalt psychologists rejected the “constancy hy­pothesis” that was generally taken for granted early in the twentieth century, namely that there is a constant point-for-point correspondence between physical char­acteristics of a stimulus and the psychological attri­butes of the resulting sensation. In numerous experi­ments they demonstrated that local perceptual qualities vary not just with the local stimulus but with the con­texts that surround the stimulus. Percepts are not im­mutable correlates of the local physical stimuli that give rise to them, but reflect specific interactive rela­tional aspects of a stimulus complex. The well-known perceptual constancies (size, shape, color, brightness, etc.) are all inconsistent with the “constancy hypothe­sis”: for example. the perceived brightness of a small spot in a large visual field depends upon not only the light intensity of the spot itself but also the intensity of the spot’s surround. Comparably, color contrast phe­nomena disprove the “constancy hypothesis”; the same gray circle will appear greenish if surrounded by violet, or yellow if surrounded by blue. Perceptual attributes such as size, shape, color, brightness, movement, etc., are relationally determined.

Relational determination also plays a crucial role in many cognitive (and physiological) functions other than sensation and perception. While it is central in perceptual organization (as in controlling what aspects of a complex sensory input will be perceived as figure and which as ground), it is also at the core of produc­tive thinking. To solve a problem productively, it is nec­essary to understand what aspects of it are essential and which superficial or irrelevant, as well as the crit­ical interrelations among the core aspects. In most psy­chological wholes or Gestalten the parts are not indif­ferent to each other, but are mutually interdependent; indeed the attributes of the separate component parts of the Gestalt are determined by their place, role, and function within the whole of which they are parts. Pro­ductive thinking involves transforming a confused, fuzzy, meaningless view of a problem into a clear con­ception of it that takes all the relevant features into account; such reorganization or restructuring of the problem results in insight, understanding, and its so­lution, if the reorganization is adequate to the central features of the problem.

This view of problem solving, and of learning, con­trasted sharply, in its emphasis on meaningfulness, with the views of learning that prevailed in other schools, which instead emphasized blind contiguity in space and time (as in traditional associationism and as in the process of classical conditioning that was con­sidered prototypic of learning by behaviorists). The top-down approach of the Gestalt theorists, making the whole primary, was the opposite of the bottom-up ap­proach typical of psychologists in other schools, which began with “elements” (such as sensations. or stimuli and responses) and studied how they combine to add up to a whole.

The Gestalt psychologists contrasted their “dynamic” view with what they called the static “machine theory” of their opponents. Natural systems—in physics and physiology as well as in psychology—undergo “dy­namic self-distribution,” as in electrical or magnetic fields, such that the organization of any Gestalt or whole will be as “good” as the prevailing conditions allow. This “principle of Pragnanz,” as the Gestalt psy­chologists called it, makes unnecessary the arbitrary connections or mechanical constraints that “andsum” theorists use in explaining natural processes in physics, physiology, and psychology: consider the form of a soap bubble or of a drop of oil in water; they are the result not of an artificial constraining mold but of dynamic self-distribution.

Antecedents of Gestalt Psychology

Gestalt PsychologyThat a whole may be more than a mere sum of its parts had been recognized since antiquity, even by Plato. Dur­ing the nineteenth century several philosophers em­phasized that a thoroughgoing simple elementism is in­adequate. For example, John Stuart Mill objected to his father James Mill’s theory of mind as the sum total of sensations and images associated via contiguity in space and time. He argued that the properties of chem­ical compounds may not be deducible from the prop­erties of their constituent elements in isolation, and proposed a “mental chemistry” in contrast with his fa­ther’s “mental mechanics.” Even Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt, one of whose objectives was to analyze the con­tents of consciousness into their constituent “mental elements,” had been compelled to acknowledge that mental compounds may display emergent qualities that are not to be found in their constituent elements in isolation—a result that he proposed is due to a principle of “creative synthesis” that characterizes human men­tal processes.

In 1890, Christian von Ehrenfels argued that “form qualities” such as squareness, circularity—or a mel­ody—are separate elements over and above the com­ponent elements of a whole. Thus a square is, in effect, the sum of four equal straight lines plus four right an­gles—plus the “Gestalt quality” of “squareness,” The lengths of the lines or their color can be changed, but this will not alter the squareness of the square; you can transpose a melody into a different key, changing every note, yet the melody remains unchanged. He pro­posed that it is the transposability of Gestalt qualities, their independence of the specific qualities of the other elements, that is the criterion for their existence.

The Emergence of Gestalt Theory

In 1910 Max Wertheimer pointed out that the “primi­tive” music of a tribe in Ceylon had a complex struc­ture, in which early parts of a melody set up require­ments for the melody’s continuation. Two years later (1912a) he analyzed examples of numerical thinking in aboriginal peoples that is not purely summative but that takes into account the dynamic and structural fea­tures of the problem to which the numerical thinking is applied. For example, if one divides a chain of eight links in half one has two chains of four links each: another division yields four sets of two links each: but with yet another division there no longer is a chain. In certain situations “one, a couple, a few, many” is an appropriate quantitative scale: and no reasonable per­son would specify an amount of rice in terms of the number of kernels it contains.

Structural and dynamic features take precedence over “elements” and their “andsums.” It is not appro­priate to think of wholes as the sum total of their parts, or, as in von Ehrenfels’s case, as “more” than the sum total of their parts (the “elemental parts” plus the ele­ment of “Gestalt quality”). Rather, wholes are entirely different from any summation; they have their own in­herent properties that in turn determine the nature of the parts. There is no need to refer to “elements.” whether they be in the form of James Mill’s elementism, Wundt’s product of creative synthesis, or Ehrenfels’s constituent elements plus form quality.

Another 1912 article by Max Wertheimer (1912b) on the perception of apparent movement is generally viewed as the founding publication of the Gestalt school (see Ash, 1995. for a thorough account of the emergence of the Gestalt school of psychology in Ger­many). When two adjacent stationary visual stimuli are presented successively under appropriate spatial and temporal conditions, the result is a compelling percep­tion not of two successively presented stationary stim­uli nor of two simultaneously presented ones, but of a single object moving from one location to another. The Gestalt of the entire exposure is such that the perceived motion is entirely different from the characteristics of the two sensations in isolation, and no combination of “elements” can explain the percept; it is totally different from any “sum” of its “parts.” This demonstration also convincingly disproved the “constancy hypothesis” of an immutable relation between stimulus and sensation; the motion is in the percept but nowhere in the stimuli. The whole, the Gestalt, had become primary percep­tually and ontogenetically.

Wolfgang Kohler and Kurt Koffka were among the participants in Wertheimer’s experiments on apparent motion. They joined Wertheimer in promoting Gestalt psychology during the ensuing decades.

Major Proponents and Landmarks of Gestalt Psychology

Gestalt PsychologyWertheimer, Kohler, and Koffka are generally viewed as the three original Gestalt theorists. All of them had been students of Carl Stumpf at Berlin, and had been influenced by Stumpf’s holism and his advocacy of the phenomenological method in experimental psychology. Erich Moritz von Hornbostel was an early advocate of the school. but went on to devote himself primarily to ethnomusicology. Kurt Lewin, younger than the three founders, broadened the Gestalt approach into a some­what looser “field theory” and applied it to motivation, personality, and social psychology. Gestalt psychologists of the second generation include the following: Rudolf Arnheim applied the theory to the psychology of art. Karl Duncker performed experiments on problem solv­ing using verbal protocols. His experimental work on induced motion established that if an object and its surrounding environment move relative to each other the movement is perceived as occurring in the object rather than in the frame. Hans Wallach did extensive experimental work primarily in perception. Solomon E. Asch, in addition to experiments in perception, associ­ation, and personality. developed a Gestalt perspective on social psychology. Abraham S. Luchins performed experiments on the debilitating effects of set on prob­lem solving. George Katona’s work on organizing and memorizing summarized experiments demonstrating the superiority of Gestalt-based meaningful learning over rote memorization. He later became a pioneer in the new discipline of psychological economics. Mary Henle, an experimental psychologist, published significant papers on the nature and history of the Gestalt approach and prepared several anthologies of Gestalt work. Wolfgang Metzger promulgated the Gestalt per­spective in Germany after the three founders had emi­grated to the United States.

Soon the Gestalt school expanded its perspective into almost all subfields of psychology. During the 1920s Wertheimer published articles with many examples of productive thinking, and also wrote on how the prin­ciple of Pragnanz results in the organized perception of integrated objects in the world through the opera­tion of the principles of perceptual organization. Koffka applied the Gestalt perspective to the psychology of mental development. Kohler reported pioneering stud­ies of problem solving in chimpanzees, demonstrating their capacity for meaningful insight; experiments on transposition that generated international interest; and detailed explorations of the implications of the Gestalt approach in physics, biology, chemistry, and physiology. During the 1930s and later, Kohler published a number of books on Gestalt psychology that were to become world renowned; Koffka wrote a mid-1930s major text on Gestalt theory summarizing its experimental foun­dations and developing systematic theoretical positions about most of the significant psychological issues of the time. Wertheimer’s posthumous book on productive thinking was published in the 1940s. Condensed En­glish translations of significant Gestalt publications were made available by Willis D. Ellis in 1938 (and re­issued thereafter). Wertheimer’s book on productive thinking was reissued in 1959, 1978, and 1982, and translated into several foreign languages. German translations of Wertheimer’s late essays on truth, ethics, freedom, and democracy were prepared during the 1990s. An international multidisciplinary quarterly journal, Gestalt Theory, the official journal of the Soci­ety for Gestalt Theory and Its Applications, has been published by Westdeutscher Verlag in Wiesbaden, Ger­many, since 1979. Although all the first, and most of the second, generation of Gestalt psychologists had died, Gestalt theory continued to be highly visible.

By the end of the twentieth century, Gestalt thought was evident in a wide array of contemporary research. The Gestalt work on productive thinking was frequently viewed as posing challenging problems for cognitive psychology (e.g., Murray, 1995; Sternberg & Davidson, 1995), and the early experimental work on the percep­tual constancies, on the perception of movement, and on the organization of perception continued to interest visual physiologists and cognitive neuroscientists (e.g., Rock & Palmer, 1990; Spillmann & Ehrenstein, 1996). Writers on social psychology, personality, and psychopathology continued to use a Gestalt perspective, some explicitly and many implicitly. A Gestalt orientation continued to permeate a significant number of theo­retical and empirical approaches in almost all areas of psychology.

Bibliography:

  1. Ash, M, C. (1995), Gestalt psychology in German culture, 1890-1967: Holism and the quest for objectivity, New York: Cambridge University Press.
  2. Ellis, W. D. (1967). A source book of Gestalt psychology. New York: Harcourt, Brace. (Original work published 1938)
  3. Koffka. K. (1935). Principles of Gestalt psychology. New York: Harcourt. Brace.
  4. Murray, D. J. (1995). Gestalt psychology and the cognitive rev­olution. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
  5. Rock. I., & Palmer. S. (1990). The legacy of Gestalt psy­chology. Scientific American, 263 (6), 84-90.
  6. Spillmann, L., & Ehrenstein, W. H, (1996). From neuron to Gestalt. In R. Greger. & V, Windhorst (Eds.). Comprehen­sive human physiology: Mechanisms of visual perception (Vol. i. pp. 861-893), Heidelberg: Springer.
  7. Sternberg. R. J., & Davidson. J. E. (Eds.). (1995). The nature of insight. Cambridge. MA: Bradford/MIT Press.
  8. von Ehrenfels. C. (1890). Uber Gestaltqualitaten [On Ge­stalt qualities]. Vierteljahresschrift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophic. 14, 249-292.
  9. Wertheimer. M. (1910). Musik der Wedda [The music of the Veddas]. Sammelbunde der internationalen Musikgesellschaft, it. 300-309.
  10. Wertheimer. M. (1912a). Uber das Denken der Natur-volker 1. Zahlen und Zahlgebilde [On the thinking of aboriginal people: 1. Numbers and numerical concepts]. Zeitschrift fur Psychologie, 60. 321-378.
  11. Wertheimer. M. (1912b). Experimentelle Studien fiber das Sehen von Bewegung [Experimental studies of the per­ception of movement]. Zeitschrift fur Psychologie, 61. 161-265.
  12. Wertheimer. M. (1982). Productive thinking. Chicago: Uni­versity of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1945)

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